Radical sensorimotor enactivism & predictive processing : providing a conceptual framework for the scientific study of conscious perception by Downey, Adrian
Downey, A. (2017). Radical Sensorimotor Enactivism & Predictive Processing –  
Providing a Conceptual Framework for the Scientific Study of Conscious Perception.
In T. Metzinger & W. Wiese (Eds.). Philosophy and Predictive Processing: 11. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958573123
1 | 16
In this paper I outline and defend a novel approach to conscious perception, 
which I label “radical sensorimotor enactivism”. The aims of the paper are 
two-fold: (1) to respond to a common objection to theories like radical sen-
sorimotor enactivism— that they are empirically vacuous— and explain why, 
because radical sensorimotor enactivism uses (a non-representational version 
of) predictive processing to operationalize its sub-personal aspects, this ob-
jection cannot be levelled at the theory; and, (2) to argue that radical sen-
sorimotor enactivism provides a better empirical account of conscious per-
ception than predictive processing taken as a stand-alone theory. I conclude 
that radical sensorimotor enactivism provides one with a strong over-arching 
conceptual framework for the scientific study of conscious perception which 
clarifies the relation between existing strands of empirical work and provides 
practical guidance for future research. As such, it is worthy of further develop-
ment, study, and application in empirical settings.
Acknowledgments 
This paper (or variants thereof) was presented at the Postgraduate WIP conference at the University of Sussex, an E-In-
tentionality seminar at the University of Sussex, at the Situating Cognition: Agency, Affect, and Extension conference held 
at the University of Warsaw, and the Philosophical Aspects of the Predictive Processing Framework conference held at the 
Frankfurt Institute for Advanced studies. I would like to thank the respective audiences of each of these talks for helpful 
discussions and constructive critical feedback. Thanks as well go to Sarah Sawyer and Chris Mole, both of whom provided 
extremely valuable feedback on the ideas contained within this paper. For helpful feedback on the manuscript itself, I 
would like to thank Joe Morrison, Joe Dewhurst, and two annonymous referees. Finally, and most importantly, I would like 
to thank Thomas Metzinger and Wanja Wiese for both: 1) providing instructive feedback on this paper, and 2) facilitating 
the creation of this volume and organising the conference upon which it is based. A lot of hard work goes on behind the 
scenes in these kind of ventures, but although it may go unseen, it does not go unappreciated – thanks very much for all 
the help. This research was financed with funding from the AHRC.
Radical Sensorimotor Enactivism & 
Predictive Processing
Providing a Conceptual Framework for  
the Scientific Study of Conscious Perception
Adrian Downey
Keywords
Consciousness | Non-representation-
al theories of cognition | Perception | 
Predictive processing | Sensorimotor 
enactivism
1  Introduction
In this paper I introduce a novel approach to conscious perception, which I label “radical sensorim-
otor enactivism” (RSE). RSE is advanced within the intellectual tradition of ecological and enactive 
approaches to mentality. It is commonly objected that theories advanced within this intellectual tradi-
tion are incapable of explaining the brain’s role in conscious perception (Chemero 2009, p. 93; Clark 
2009; Seth 2014). Consequently, it is thought that such theories provide mere descriptions of con-
scious perception which are empirically unilluminating. I explain how a non-representational version 
of predictive processing (PP) can be subsumed within RSE and used to empirically explain the brain-
based aspects of this framework. By doing so, I show that one cannot reject RSE for failing to account 
for the brain’s role in conscious perception. Furthermore, I then argue that, not only can RSE account 
for the brain’s role in conscious perception, it actually provides a better account of the brain’s role in 
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conscious perception than PP taken as a stand-alone theory. RSE provides a powerful over-arching 
conceptual framework for the scientific study of conscious perception which helps to clarify and tax-
omonise existing strands of empirical work whilst providing guidance for future research. As such, I 
conclude that it is worthy of further research, development, and application in empirical settings. 
My paper is structured as follows— in section two, I outline RSE. I explain that RSE is predicated 
on the sensorimotor enactive theory of conscious perception, but that it improves upon this theo-
ry because it can provide a better account of the sensorimotor enactive concepts of “sensorimotor 
knowledge” and “attention”. In section three I explain why theories like RSE are often thought to ignore 
the brain’s role in conscious perception, before outlining a non-representational version of PP and 
explaining how it can be subsumed within RSE. I show that this non-representational PP account can 
operationalise and empirically explain the brain-based aspects of RSE, and so it cannot be objected 
that RSE ignores the brain’s role in conscious perception. Finally, in section four, I provide two rea-
sons for preferring this conjunction of RSE and non-representational PP over a representational PP 
account. I argue that RSE provides a better explanation of conscious perception because: it provides 
a better account of the inter-relation between the sub-personal, personal, and conscious levels of ex-
planation; and, it can account for and better categorise a wider range of empirical work in cognitive 
science. Thus, I conclude that not only can RSE account for the brain’s role in conscious perception, 
it actually provides a better account of its role in conscious perception than rival theories (such as PP 
taken stand-alone). 
2  What Is Radical Sensorimotor Enactivism?
In this section I outline a novel approach to conscious perception, which I label “radical sensorimo-
tor enactivism” (RSE). I begin by outlining the sensorimotor enactive theory of conscious perception, 
upon which RSE is predicated. I explain that extant versions of this theory are problematic (from 
an enactive perspective) because the key concepts of “sensorimotor knowledge” and “attention” both 
require representation, or they are left entirely unexplained. Then, I provide a non-representational 
explanation of both of these concepts. Consequently, I arrive at a non-representational (or radical) 
version of sensorimotor enactivism, and thus at radical sensorimotor enactivism. 
2.1  Sensorimotor Enactivism
Sensorimotor enactivism (O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004; O’Regan 2011) is a direct realist theory 
of (conscious) perception. Consequently, it takes (conscious) perception to involve a direct relation 
between the perceiving organism and its environment. It explains this relation to be enabled by the 
organism’s possession of sensorimotor knowledge, which is knowledge of the law-like relation between 
sensation and movement. For example, there is a law-like relation between an organism’s movements 
and its visual stimulation— when an organism moves closer to an object the object looms in the visual 
field, when it gets further away the object appears smaller, and so on. On sensorimotor enactivism 
an organism is thought capable of perceiving only when it understands this relation between senso-
ry stimulation and movement. Finally, sensorimotor enactivism takes attention to be necessary for 
conscious perception. On this theory an organism will be conscious of its perceptual relation to the 
environment only when it attends. 
Sensorimotor enactivism traces its intellectual roots directly from the non-representational tra-
dition of enactive and ecological approaches to mentality (Gibson 1979; Varela et al. 1991; Ryle 
1949/2000; cf. Chemero 2009, fig. 2.4). However, in spite of its non-representational heritage and its 
proponents’ arguments against representational theories of conscious perception (O’Regan and Noë 
2001), extant versions of the view have not done enough to distance themselves from representation 
(as will be explained in the following sections). In particular, the key concepts of “sensorimotor knowl-
edge” and “attention” are both explained in a manner which makes indispensable use of the concept 
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of “representation”. Consequently, these key terms have either received a representational explanation, 
or they are left underspecified. I am going to provide a non-representational account of both of them, 
and therefore arrive at a thoroughly non-representational version of sensorimotor enactivism. 
2.1.1  Non-Representational Sensorimotor Knowledge
It is often emphasised that sensorimotor knowledge should be understood as a kind of practical skill, 
which is predicated upon the organism’s possessing a certain kind of embodied know-how. How-
ever, in spite of its purported non-representational credentials, the concept itself appears to require 
representation. This point has been most forcefully argued for by Hutto (Hutto 2005; cf. Hutto and 
Myin 2013, pp. 23-32). Hutto argues that, in order to amount to any kind of substantive claim about 
the nature of perception which can play any sort of explanatory role, the concept of “sensorimo-
tor knowledge” requires representation. Consequently, in order to provide a properly radical version 
of sensorimotor enactivism, I must provide a thoroughly non-representational and yet explanatorily 
substantive account of sensorimotor knowledge.
At the sub-personal level of explanation, I propose that sensorimotor knowledge be explained in 
a psychological behaviourist manner (cf. Block 2001). Psychological behaviourists took mentality to 
be constituted by a series of relations between sensory input and motor output, with a given sensory 
input related to a given motor output (or series of motor outputs, depending on the organism’s phylo-
genetic and ontogenetic history). If we explain sensorimotor knowledge in this manner, then it can be 
taken to concern a series of relations between certain sensory inputs to, and certain other motor out-
puts from, the brain. On this sub-personal account of sensorimotor knowledge, the brain acts merely 
as a causal mediator between certain neural inputs and certain motor outputs, and so one avoids pos-
tulating representation at the sub-personal level (cf. Ramsey 2009, ch. 4). 
At the personal level of explanation, I propose that sensorimotor knowledge be understood in 
terms of Ryle’s theory of knowledge-how (Ryle 1949/2000, ch. 2). On this theory, knowledge-how is 
understood wholly in terms of behavioural dispositions— if an organism possesses knowledge of how 
to perform an activity, then this knowledge-how will be exhibited in the organism’s actual behaviour 
and their counter-factual behavioural tendencies. For example, if an organism knows how to throw 
a stone, then it will exhibit stone-throwing behaviour in scenarios where stones are available and the 
organism deems it pertinent to throw them. If we apply this Rylean account of knowledge-how to 
personal level sensorimotor knowledge, then we should take the ability to perceive to be exercised 
when the organism is disposed to engage in perceptual behaviour. It will, for example, exhibit mating 
behaviour when it sees another member of its species of the requisite sex, when it smells the presence 
of such a member, and so on and so forth. If the organism is disposed to behave in a manner consistent 
with its understanding the law-like relation between sensation and movement, that organism can be 
considered to possess personal level sensorimotor knowledge. Once more, because this personal level 
account of sensorimotor knowledge is entirely concerned with dispositions, one definitively avoids 
representation. 
By providing an account of sensorimotor knowledge upon which it is wholly constituted by 
non-representational causal mediation and/or dispositions at both the sub-personal and personal lev-
els of explanation, we therefore arrive at a thoroughly non-representational account of sensorimotor 
knowledge. In section three, I will explain how this non-representational account can be made explan-
atorily substantive. 
2.1.2  Non-Representational Attention
Although sensorimotor enactivism takes attention to be necessary for conscious perception, there 
has been hardly any work focused on providing a substantive account of what, exactly, is meant by 
“attention”. The only proposal within this vicinity has been provided by O’Regan , who argues that sen-
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sorimotor enactivism should adopt a higher-order thought approach to consciousness (O’Regan 2011). 
Given that attention is necessary for consciousness, it could therefore follow that attention is itself 
to be explained in terms of higher-order thought theory. Higher-order thought theory understands 
consciousness to occur when an organism possesses a higher-order thought about a lower-order men-
tal state. For example, the organism’s visual states will become conscious when it has a higher-or-
der thought about those states. This theory indispensably requires representation (the higher-order 
thought is about the lower-order state).1 Consequently, acceptance of a higher-order thought approach 
to attention requires acceptance of representation. Therefore, extant sensorimotor enactive accounts 
either do not explain attention at all, or they explain it in terms of representation. I am going to pro-
pose a non-representational theory of attention. First, I will outline Mole’s metaphysical distinction 
between “process” and “adverb”. Then, I will explain how Mole applies this metaphysical distinction 
to the case of attention. Finally, I will outline Mole’s adverbial theory of attention, before providing a 
non-representational version of the theory and applying it to sensorimotor enactivism. 
2.1.2.1  Distinguishing “Process” and “Adverb”
Mole’s adverbial theory of attention is predicated upon a metaphysical distinction between the con-
cepts of “process” and “adverb”. He summarises this distinction as follows: 
A taxonomy is a taxonomy on the basis of process if the taxonomy classifies events on the basis of having or 
gaining of a property by an object. A taxonomy is a taxonomy on the basis of manner if the taxonomy classi-
fies events on the basis of the having or gaining of a property by an event. (Mole 2011, p. 29, italics in original) 
In order to determine the metaphysical category of a given x, Mole argues that we must consider 
the following two questions (Mole 2011, ch. 2):
1. What is x?
2. What does it mean for x to occur?
Mole argues that x should be accorded the metaphysical status of process if, in determining its 
metaphysical status, it is most natural to answer question (1) first. If, however, it is more natural to 
answer question (2) first, then Mole concludes that x should be accorded the metaphysical status of 
adverb. Mole uses the examples of “combustion” and “hastily” (a process and adverb respectively) to 
make this point clearer. 
In order to determine the metaphysical category of combustion it is natural to answer question one 
first. Combustion occurs when an object gains the property of burning because, when an object com-
busts, a chemical reaction between oxygen and fuel occurs which results in burning. We can therefore 
classify combustion as a process which occurs to an object and causes it to gain the property of burn-
ing. Having arrived at an answer to question one, the answer to question two becomes obvious. For 
combustion to occur we require that the chemical process of burning occurs. For this reason, Mole 
labels combustion a process-first phenomenon— in order to determine what combustion is we have to 
first understand what the process of combustion is. 
Consider now the adverb “hastily”. This adverb can be used to describe many different types of 
event— the publication of a newspaper can be performed hastily, a person’s walk to the train station 
can be performed hastily, and the actions of two particular Hobbits in Middle Earth can be hastily 
performed (or at least, considered as such from the perspective of a disapproving Ent). Each of these 
events involve entirely different processes and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a pro-
1 Put more precisely, all extant versions of higher-order thought theory indispensably require representation. Although higher-order thought theory 
could perhaps be explained without representation, no such version of this theory has as yet been proposed.
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cess which all of these hastily executed events have in common. Consequently, one cannot determine 
whether x was hasty solely by focusing on the process of x. Each of these events are similar because 
they are carried out in a similar manner (hastily), and not because they involve the same processes. As 
such, if we are to determine whether a given x was performed hastily, we need to understand the man-
ner in which the process of x was carried out. Thus, given that it is most natural to answer question 
two first when determining whether an event was hasty, haste should be accorded the metaphysical 
status of adverb. 
In summary— Mole argues that there is a metaphysical difference between certain processes and 
events, and he claims that this difference is captured by the metaphysical categories of “process” and 
“adverb”. Process-first phenomena can be grouped into the same set because they all involve an object 
gaining a property by undergoing a particular process. Adverbial phenomena, on the other hand, can 
be grouped into the same set because they all involve an event gaining a property by being carried out 
in a particular manner. In order to determine the metaphysical category of a given x, one must deter-
mine whether it makes more sense to ask first of x what process it involves, or to instead ask first of x 
the manner in which its process is carried out.
2.1.2.2  Applying the Distinction to Attention
In order to apply Mole’s metaphysical taxonomy to attention, we must ask the following two questions:
1.  What is attention?
2. What is it for something to be done attentively?
(Mole 2011, p. 24)
Philosophers and psychologists have traditionally answered question one first. Consequently, they 
tend to believe that attention is a process-first phenomenon. The consensus view that attention is a 
process has not, however, led to a consensus opinion on what “attention” is. Indeed, there are so many 
different candidates for explaining the process of attention that most psychologists do not believe 
there is a single set of processes which are necessary and sufficient for attention. Mole argues against 
process-first theories of attention (arguments which I will not rehearse here), and in their stead offers 
his own positive proposal about how attention should be classified. In determining the metaphysical 
category of attention, Mole argues that it is most natural to ask question (2) first. Thus, he concludes 
that attention should be understood as an adverb. 
According to Mole, when an organism attends to x, it does so by ‘attentively x-ing’. His Cognitive 
Unison theory proposes that attention occurs when an organism uses its cognitive resources in unison 
to perform a task. According to Mole, if an organism is to count as performing a task, the following 
three conditions must be met (Mole 2011, pp. 52-5):
1. The task must include the organism.
2. The organism must know-how to perform the task. 
3. The organism must be putting their know-how to use. 
Mole therefore argues that attention occurs when an organism uses its cognitive resources in uni-
son to attend to task x. Organisms will only count as ‘attentively x-ing’ if it is the organism itself which 
performs x, the organism knows-how to x, and the organism is currently engaged in x-ing. If these 
three conditions are met, then the organism can be ascribed the adverbial property of ‘attentively 
x-ing’. 
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2.1.2.3  ‘Radicalising’ Cognitive Unison
Mole’s version of Cognitive Unison theory requires representation at both the personal and sub-per-
sonal levels of explanation. Mole takes attention to be a type of personal level cognition, and he argues 
that personal level cognition is representational:
A cognitive process, in this sense, is a process that operates on representations that encode their contents 
for the agent of the task: In order for a process to count as cognitive, there must be an agent-level contentful 
state whose content is directly determined, at least in part, by the content of the representations on which 
that process operates. (Mole 2011, pp. 57-58, italics in original)
Furthermore, at the sub-personal level of empirical implementation, Mole argues that Cognitive 
Unison is best understood as implemented via biased-competition: 
If the cognitive unison theory gives us the correct account of what attention is, then the biased-competition 
model may give us the correct account of how many instances of this attention-realizing unison come about, 
and of how they get maintained. (Mole 2011, p. 133, italics in original)
Competition models of cognition take different areas of the brain to be engaged in constant com-
petition with one another, with their end goal thought to be that of controlling neural processing. 
Biased-competition theory is a theory of attention which explains neural competition in terms of 
brain-based representations vying for control of the brain (Desimone and Duncan 1995). Conse-
quently, biased-competition is a representational theory of attention, and so Cognitive Unison appears 
to require representation at the sub-personal level. Thus, in order to provide a non-representational 
version of Cognitive Unison, I must explain: how personal level cognition can be explained without 
representation; and, explain how biased-competition could occur without requiring representation. 
Spatial constraints require that I do not argue for any particular non-representational theory of 
personal level cognition here. Instead, I am going to assume that a non-representational theory of 
personal level cognition could be given (see, for example Anderson 2014; Barrett 2011; Chemero 2009; 
Hutto and Myin 2013; Ramsey 2009).2 Given that there are plenty of non-representational theories 
of cognition present in the literature, and given that Cognitive Unison is itself a type of cognition, it 
therefore follows that Cognitive Unison can be accepted without requiring representation. Therefore, 
provided one accepts a non-representational theory of cognition, one can arrive at a non-representa-
tional version of Cognitive Unison theory. 
Where the empirical implementation of Cognitive Unison is concerned, although biased-compe-
tition theories are representational theories, there are non-representational alternatives to be found 
in the literature. One such approach is developed in the work of Anderson (Anderson 2014, esp. chs. 
5 & 6; Anderson 2015). In his 2014 After Phrenology, Anderson argues for an extremely anti-mod-
ular, neural-reuse theory of cognition, upon which different neural regions are constantly altering 
their connections with one another in response to various task-demands. Anderson claims that brains 
are constantly engaged in the formation and dissolution of what he labels “transiently-assembled-lo-
cal-neural-subsystems” (or TALoNS, for short). Although TALoNS can be studied via the traditional 
methods of systems neuroscience (for example Sporns 2010), Anderson argues that we can come to a 
better understanding of TALoNS if we adopt the affordance competition hypothesis. 
“Affordance” is a theoretical concept which states that organisms perceive their environment in 
terms of the activities it affords (Gibson 1979). Humans, for example, are thought to perceive chairs 
2 Note, I am not assuming the truth of such non-representational theories of cognition. Rather, I am only claiming that non-representational theories 
of cognition can be provided. Even the staunchest representational theorist has to agree on this point, on pain of making representational theories of 
cognition true a priori and so empirically vacuous (Ramsey 2015).  
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as affording sitting behaviour, and so humans will perceive them as ‘sit-upon-able’. The Affordance 
Competition Hypothesis proposes that organisms are constantly engaged in processing multiple en-
vironmental affordances at any given time— affordances compete with one another within the brain, 
with the winning affordance being the one that ends up controlling behaviour (Cisek 2015).
Anderson argues that the brain’s neural dynamics should be studied in terms of affordance compe-
tition. By conceptualising neural dynamics in this manner, he contends that we can come to an under-
standing of why TALoNS are constantly being formed and re-formed ‘on the fly’.3 TALoNS are formed 
‘on the fly’ because different affordances are competing with one another within the brain, with the 
winning affordance being the one which determines the nature of the TALoNS being deployed. An-
derson labels his theory “biased-affordance-competition”, and he is quite explicit that it should not be 
understood in terms of representation. Because Anderson provides a non-representational version 
of biased-competition theory, we can apply his framework to Cognitive Unison theory and therefore 
arrive at a non-representational empirical implementation of it. 
Cognitive Unison theory understands attention to be a type of personal level cognition which is 
empirically implemented via biased-competition. Although Mole’s own version of the view requires 
representation, I have explained how the view can be accepted without requiring representation— we 
accept a non-representational account of personal level cognition and a non-representational account 
of biased-competition (biased-affordance-competition). At this point, we have arrived at a non-repre-
sentational (adverbial) theory of attention. 
2.2  ‘Radical’ Sensorimotor Enactivism
Having explained how the key sensorimotor enactive concepts of “sensorimotor knowledge” and “at-
tention” could both be accounted for without requiring representation, we can now provide a thor-
oughly non-representational version of sensorimotor enactivism. At this point, we therefore arrive at 
radical sensorimotor enactivism (RSE). RSE is predicated upon the sensorimotor enactive account of 
conscious perception. As such, it understands perception to be constituted by a direct relation between 
perceiver and environment which is enabled by the possession and exercise of sensorimotor knowl-
edge. The organism becomes conscious of their perceptual relation to the environment only when they 
attend to it. RSE improves upon sensorimotor enactivism because: it provides a non-representational 
account of sensorimotor knowledge; and, it provides a non-representational account of attention.4
In order to better appreciate RSE, it will help to consider an example. Imagine the following sce-
nario— two people who take the exact same route whilst walking through a park, and who carry out 
the same perceptual processes. One of the walkers, who I will label the “mindful-walker”, is walking 
through the park whilst practising mindfulness meditation. This being the case, they are consciously 
aware of their various perceptual relations to the environment as they make their way through the 
park. They can see the bright red of the rose in front of them, feel the cool breeze on their neck, and 
hear the gentling rustling of leaves behind them. The other walker, although taking the exact same 
route through the park, is not consciously aware of their perceptual relation to the environment. This 
worrying-walker is currently in the midst of a financial crisis, and they are trying to work out how best 
to extricate themselves from their distressing predicament. Because both walkers take the same routes 
and engage in the same perceptual processing, each walker can be said to perceive. This explains why 
neither walker trips over branches, why both divert their gaze when they (accidently) look straight at 
3 I derive my use of this phrase from Clark’s discussion of TALoNS (Clark 2016). 
4 Of course, my claim— that RSE improves upon sensorimotor enactivism— is reliant on the prior assumption that non-representational theories of 
conscious perception are to be preferred over representational ones. Although I do think that non-representational theories of conscious perception 
should be preferred over representational ones (see Anderson 2014; Chemero 2009; Downey 2016, ch. 3; Hutto and Myin 2013), I will not rely on 
this claim here. Rather, I will simply re-iterate an earlier noted point: sensorimotor enactivism has been advanced primarily as a non-representational 
theory and draws its intellectual roots from the non-representational tradition of enactive and ecological approaches to mentality. Consequently, a 
non-representational version of the theory is to be preferred.     
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the sun, and so on and so forth. However, although both walkers are perceiving, only one walker is 
conscious of their perceptual states— the mindful-walker. RSE explains the difference between each 
walker in terms of attention: the mindful-walker is engaged in ‘attentive-perception’ whereas the wor-
rying-walker is not. Whilst the former is using their cognitive resources in unison to attend to the task 
of perception, the latter is using their cognitive resources in unison to attend to their financial prob-
lems. Thus the difference between the two walkers, and the reason why one is conscious of their per-
ceptual relation to the environment whilst the other is not, is an adverbial one. It concerns the manner 
in which each walker engages in the task of perception, and so is not solely concerned with the per-
ceptual processing itself. Although both walkers are engaged in the same sort of perceptual processing, 
only one of these walkers (the mindful-walker) carries out the perceptual processing ‘attentively’. 
3  RSE, Brains, and Predictive Processing
It is often objected that enactive and ecological accounts of conscious perception, such as RSE, are 
empirically inadequate. These theories are often considered to provide mere descriptions of conscious 
perception, whilst failing to provide any substantive empirical insights or interesting hypotheses. In 
particular, it is often argued that these theories are incapable of accounting for the (undoubtedly key) 
role of the brain in conscious perception (Chemero 2009, p. 93; Clark 2009; Seth 2014). The empirical 
paradigm of predictive processing, on the other hand, is generally considered to provide a good ac-
count of the brain’s role in conscious perception (Clark 2013; Clark 2016; Hohwy 2013; Hohwy 2016; 
Seth 2014). In this section, I am going to explain how predictive processing can be subsumed within 
RSE. Therefore, I will conclude that RSE can account for the brain’s role in conscious perception, and 
so RSE cannot be rejected for failing to do so. 
3.1  What is Predictive Processing?
Predictive Processing (PP) conceives of the brain as a prediction machine whose sole role is to mini-
mise prediction-error (Clark 2013; Clark 2016; Hohwy 2013). According to this theory, the brain uses 
Bayes’ theorem (or an approximation thereof) to update internal generative models, which are used 
to derive a best-guess as to the external causes of its current sensory input. The brain is constantly 
updating these models in response to error-signals (which mark a divergence between predicted input 
and actual input) and this occurs via the process of active inference. In active inference, the brain can 
either: change its model to fit the incoming sensory stream, or, change the incoming sensory stream to 
fit its model (for example, by moving). Perception, on this account, is constituted by the brain’s expec-
tations as to the external causes of its perceptual input.5 Importantly, the terms “prediction” and “ex-
pectation” are wholly sub-personal and non-conscious. We, qua personal level agents, are not aware of 
the Bayesian nature of our perceptual processes. Rather, these perceptual processes are carried out at, 
and applicable to, the sub-personal level of explanation. 
Given that the world we live in is inherently uncertain and unpredictable, it is inevitable that there 
will be errors within the brain’s internal generative models. In order to make the processing of er-
ror-signals manageable, the brain must have a mechanism for determining which error-signals should 
be scrutinised more carefully, and which should be ignored. PP theorists suggest that the brain can do 
this via assignments of precision-weighting. These assignments concern the amount of ‘weight’ or ‘gain’ 
which will be accorded to a given error-signal. The more weight or gain an error-signal receives, the 
more it will be able to influence the internal generative models created by the brain. Analogously, the 
lower the weight or gain assigned to a given error-signal, the less influence this signal is likely to have 
on the brain’s internal generative models. Precision-weighting thus provides the means through which 
the brain can make its task (of minimising prediction-error) manageable. 
5 Note, these expectations are considered to be essentially action-oriented (Wiese and Metzinger 2017). 
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3.2  Non-Representational Predictive Processing
PP has been advanced and developed as a theory which is situated firmly within the cognitivist par-
adigm in cognitive science (Von Helmholtz 1867; Gregory 1980). As such, it is unsurprising that PP 
is generally taken to indispensably require representation (Clark 2016; Gładziejewski 2016; Hohwy 
2013, ch. 8). In order to make PP compatible with RSE, I must provide a non-representational account 
of its key posits. Orlandi has recently provided such an account, arguing that the key PP posits of 
“prediction-signal”, “error-signal”, “prior probability”, “hyper-prior”, and “likelihood” all fail Ramsey’s 
job-description challenge. As such, she concludes that these posits do not deserve a representational 
status. In this sub-section, I will summarise Orlandi’s argument.6 
In his 2009 Representation Reconsidered, Ramsey proposes a strategy for determining whether or 
not a given mechanism deserves to be described in terms of representation. In order to count as repre-
sentational, Ramsey argues that the mechanism in question must play a causal and functional role in a 
system which is recogniseably representational. He claims that we should determine whether or not its 
role is recogniseably representational by comparing the properties of the mechanism with the proper-
ties of an artefact which we would pre-theoretically regard as representational. If the mechanism fulfils 
the same functional role as a proto-typically representational artefact, then that mechanism passes the 
job-description challenge and so deserves to be described in terms of representation. 
Orlandi applies this argumentative strategy to PP and concludes that its posits fail the job-descrip-
tion challenge (Orlandi 2015; cf. Orlandi 2014). She first argues that the concepts “prediction-signal” 
and “error-signal” (which are often applied to low- and mid- levels of the neural hierarchy by PP theo-
rists) are concerned only with proximal conditions and so can be explained in terms of causal covari-
ation. She then argues that causal covariation accounts of representation are not truly representational 
because they fail the job-description challenge— these accounts concern only correlation between 
neural events, and such correlation is more naturally described in terms of causal mediation than 
in terms of representation (cf. Hutto and Myin 2013, ch. 4; Ramsey 2009, ch. 4). Consequently, she 
concludes that prediction- and error- signals in the brain should be described as non-representational 
causal mediators. Finally, she argues that the concepts of “prior”, “hyper-prior”, and “likelihood” them-
selves fail the job-description challenge because they act only as biases which pre-dispose the brain to 
enter into certain neural arrangements.7 Consider, for example, the functional role played by a pump 
in a typical water-fountain. When water reaches the bottom bowl of a fountain, it pools around the 
opening to a pump. This pump sucks a small proportion of water in and pushes it back up to the top 
of the fountain, where the water once more begins to trickle down. Only a small proportion of water 
will be pumped up to the top of the fountain at any given time, because if too much were to flow from 
the top at once the fountain would malfunction (e.g. it may overflow). The pump therefore plays the 
functional role of biasing the flow of a system of water, such that there will always be a large pool of 
water at the bottom of the fountain and only a small amount at the top. We would not, of course, de-
scribe the biasing function of this pump in terms of representation. According to Orlandi, higher-level 
aspects of the PP neural hierarchy are best described as playing exactly the same sort of biasing role 
within the brain. Just as the pump in a water-fountain plays the role of pre-disposing the fountain to 
instantiate a certain water-cycle when presented with water, so too do higher-level posits of PP play 
the non-representational function of pre-disposing neural systems to enter into certain arrangements 
whenever presented with a given environmental stimulus. Consequently, Orlandi concludes that PP 
processing is entirely non-representational.8
6 My thanks to Zoe Drayson , for bringing Orlandi’s work to my attention. 
7 Orlandi provides a number of other arguments against treating higher-level PP processing in terms of representation, but spatial constraints require 
that I do not rehearse these arguments here. 
8 Orlandi does, however, conclude that the results of this processing (the ‘winning hypothesis’) should be described in terms of representation. I explain 
why I think this conclusion should be rejected, in the context of RSE, in footnote 11 of this paper.   
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Although this conclusion may appear merely cosmetic or superficial— we replace the word “repre-
sentation” with “causal-mediation” or “non-representational bias” when describing PP processing— it 
in fact has profound empirical consequences. If low- and mid- level aspects of PP processing involve 
mere causal mediation, then empirical work on PP has much more in common with pre-cognitivist 
paradigms in the mind sciences (such as psychological behaviourism) than is often realized (cf. Ram-
sey 2009). Furthermore, if higher-level PP posits are to be understood as non-representational biases, 
then this should lead to an emphasis on empirical frameworks which conceive of neural processing 
in such terms. We should therefore be led to emphasise empirical approaches such as visual scence 
statistics (championed by Orlandi) or Anderson’s biased-affordance-competition framework (Ander-
son 2014; Anderson and Finlay 2014) because these approaches can be used to study and explain how 
non-representational biases within the brain are created and maintained. Thus, accepting a non-rep-
resentational account of PP processing has consequences not only for our understanding of current 
empirical work, but also for the kind of empirical work we subsequently engage in. 
In short, although PP is generally assumed to indispensably require representation, a closer look at 
the actual causal role its posits play within the neural hierarchy should lead one to the conclusion that 
PP does not require representation. Prediction- and error- signals should be understood in terms of 
non-representational causal mediation, whilst priors, hyper-priors, and likelihoods should be under-
stood as non-representational neuronal biases. This conclusion has empirical consequences because 
it requires a re-conceptualisation of extant empirical work and favours certain approaches to future 
research. Having arrived at a non-representational account of PP,9 I am now going to explain how this 
account could be subsumed within RSE. 
3.3  RSE and Non-Representational PP
In section two of this paper, we saw that RSE explains perception to be predicated on an organism’s 
possession of sensorimotor knowledge and conscious perception in terms of its ability to ‘attentively 
perceive’. Having stated that PP does account for brain-based processing, and having argued for a 
non-representational version of PP, I am now going to explain how this account can be subsumed 
within RSE. I will explain how non-representational PP can be used to provide an empirical explana-
tion of the sub-personal aspects of RSE. Consequently, I will show that RSE can account for the brain’s 
role in conscious perception. 
PP describes perception as a sub-personal process concerning action-oriented expectations about 
perceptual stimulation. As such, it matches exactly the description of sub-personal sensorimotor 
knowledge. PP can therefore be used to provide an operationalisation of brain-based sensorimotor 
knowledge (cf. Seth 2014). The reader should recall that sub-personal sensorimotor knowledge was 
explained to concern a series of relations between certain sensory inputs and certain other neural 
outputs. And we have already seen that PP processing should be understood in terms of causal medi-
ation and biased neural processing. PP can therefore be used to explain the specific relations between 
certain neural inputs and certain other neural outputs. By using PP to explain a certain facet of neural 
perceptual processing and providing a non-representational account of its posits, one could therefore 
arrive at a fully worked out empirical explanation of the brain-based, sub-personal aspects of senso-
rimotor knowledge (as that concept is understood on RSE). 
In addition to explaining sensorimotor knowledge, PP can also be applied to, and used to improve, 
Anderson’s biased-affordance-competition framework (Clark 2016, ch. 5). Clark notes that PP fits ex-
tremely well with Anderson’s framework because it too offers up an action-oriented view of perception 
which allows for extreme neural plasticity. Clark argues that PP improves upon Anderson’s framework 
9 It is worth noting that Orlandi’s argument is controversial. Although I find her general line of argument convincing, many proponents of PP are likely 
to object to it (especially those who advocate so-called conservative predictive processing (Gładziejewski 2016; Hohwy 2013; cf. Clark 2015). Spatial 
constraints dictate that I do not delve further into the details of this debate here. However, the interested reader can consult (Bruineberg & Rietveld 
2014; Chemero 2009; Downey unpublished; Ramsey 2009) for arguments germane to the one endorsed here. 
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because the concept of “precision-weighting” can be used to explain how the brain manages to config-
ure (and re-configure) TALoNS on extremely rapid time-scales. He does so by noting that the influ-
ence a given neural area has on any other given neural area can be determined via precision-weight-
ing. If signals from a particular area are given high precision, then they are likely to be propagated to 
other areas of the brain. If, however, they are given a low weighting, it is likely they will have very little 
influence within the neural system. Importantly, the precision-weighting assigned to a given signal is 
itself constantly in flux and can be rapidly altered. As such, precision-weighting allows for the rapid 
creation, and dissolution, of various neuronal coalitions. It provides the means through which differ-
ent neural areas can be allowed to influence, or be prevented from influencing, one another.10 Thus, 
not only is PP compatible with Anderson’s framework, it can in fact improve upon it.11
At the sub-personal level of empirical implementation, RSE explains perception in terms of senso-
rimotor knowledge and attention in terms of biased-affordance-competition. In this sub-section, we 
have seen that non-representational PP can be used to operationalise sensorimotor knowledge and 
that it can be used to improve Anderson’s biased-affordance-competition framework. Non-represen-
tational PP can, therefore, be used to provide an empirical explanation of the sub-personal aspects of 
RSE. By subsuming non-representational PP within RSE, we arrive at an empirically satisfactory ex-
planation of the brain’s role in conscious perception. Thus, it cannot be objected that RSE ignores the 
brain’s role in conscious perception. In short— PP is ideally suited to play the (extremely important) 
role of explaining the sub-personal, brain-based aspects of RSE. 
4  RSE Improves Upon Cognitivist PP
Thus far, I have outlined RSE and explained how applying a non-representational version of PP to the 
framework allows for an empirically adequate explanation of the brain’s role in conscious perception. 
In this section I am going to go further, and argue that RSE provides a better account of the brain’s 
role in conscious perception than PP taken as a stand-alone theory. Consequently, I conclude that not 
only can a non-representational version of PP be used to explain the sub-personal aspects of conscious 
perception on RSE. Such a use of PP is in fact preferable, because one arrives at a better account of 
conscious perception than that which can be provided by PP alone. 
4.1  Benefit One— Explaining Levels of Explanation
One of the chief benefits of accepting RSE and combining it with non-representational PP is that one 
arrives at a straight-forward account of the relation between the sub-personal, personal, and conscious 
levels of explanation. RSE explains personal level perception in terms of behavioural dispositions. The 
categorical basis of these behavioural dispositions is then explained to be brain-based— organisms 
are capable of perceiving only if they possess brain-based sensorimotor knowledge.12 This brain-based 
sensorimotor knowledge is itself understood to be constituted by a series of relations between certain 
sensory inputs and certain other motor outputs, and can be operationalised via a non-representational 
version of PP. Therefore, on RSE, the brain is considered to ‘give rise’ to personal level perception by 
controlling and driving behaviour. Conscious perception is then, similarly, explained entirely in terms 
10 On a non-representational account of PP, precision-weighting should itself be explained as a (particularly fast-acting) neurochemically mediated bias. 
11 By conjoining biased-affordance-competition and PP, we are able to reject Orlandi’s conclusion that the results of PP processing are representational. 
Orlandi concludes that the ‘winning hypothesis’ should be considered representational because it fulfils her three criteria for representation: it is con-
cerned with distal events; it is de-coupleable; and, it is used for the planning of organismal action. A conjunction of biased-affordance-competition 
and PP will identify the ‘winning hypothesis’ with the ‘winning affordance’. Because affordances are directly perceived by organisms, they neither con-
cern distal events nor are they de-coupleable (at least, not in any interesting sense which would require representation, see Anderson 2014; Chemero 
2009). Although the ‘winning affordance’ is used for the planning of organismal action, meeting this criterion alone is not sufficient for the ‘winning 
affordance’ to be ascribed a representational status (unless one deflates the meaning of representation so much that the concept becomes empirically 
vacuous, see Ramsey 2009; Ramsey 2015). Thus, on RSE, the ‘winning hypothesis’ should not be described in terms of representation. 
12 This account of the relation between sub-personal and personal levels of description is consonant with that outlined in (McDowell 1994). My thanks 
to an anonymous referee for helping me to clarify this point.
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of behaviour. On this theory, conscious perception occurs when the perceiving organism’s behavioural 
interaction with the environment is carried out ‘attentively’, with ‘attentive perception’ empirically im-
plemented in the brain via biased-affordance-competition. Thus, RSE attributes to the brain the role 
of controlling behaviour, and it explains both perception and conscious perception entirely in terms 
of behaviour. 
There is absolutely nothing mysterious or naturalistically unacceptable about the idea that a brain 
could control behaviour. Therefore, there is absolutely nothing mysterious about the relation between 
the sub-personal and personal levels of explanation on RSE. Furthermore, on this framework there is 
nothing mysterious about the relation between conscious and unconscious personal level perception. 
Personal level perception itself occurs when an organism exercises sensorimotor knowledge. If the 
exercise of this knowledge is performed attentively, then the organism’s perceptual relation to the envi-
ronment will become conscious. As such, the difference between conscious and unconscious percep-
tual processing is explained to be adverbial in nature, and there is nothing metaphysically suspicious 
or naturalistically awry with the existence of adverbial behaviour. Consequently, RSE provides a clear 
distinction between the sub-personal, personal, and conscious aspects of perception. Moreover, RSE 
makes sense of their existence and inter-relation without requiring any leaps of imaginative faith or 
speculative metaphysical theorising.
Importantly, RSE can provide this metaphysically innocuous construal of the sub-personal, per-
sonal, and conscious levels of explanation whilst providing a phenomenologically compelling account 
of (conscious) perception (Noë 2004; Ward 2012).13 Consider, in this vein, the sensorimotor enactive 
explanation of the difference between certain perceptual modalities. Each modality is considered to 
possess its own specific set of sensorimotor ‘laws’, which concern the law-like relation between move-
ment and stimulation specific to the sensory modality in question. Visual sensorimotor ‘laws’, for 
example, concern the fact that objects will loom as we get closer to them, appear smaller as we move 
further away, and disappear from view if we close our eyes. In the case of audition, however, sound 
gets louder as we move closer to its source, it gets quieter as we move away, and closing one’s eyes will 
have little (or no) effect on hearing. We can, therefore, provide a distinction between different modal-
ities of perception by explaining the relevant modality-specific sensorimotor ‘laws’. 
Although these sensorimotor ‘laws’ are described entirely in terms of an organism’s perceptual be-
haviour, they are also phenomenologically intuitive:
When it is brought to our attention that certain sensorimotor contingencies are characteristic of vision, oth-
ers of hearing, others of touch, there is an ‘aha!’ response. (Hurley and Noë 2003, p. 146)
RSE is simply a non-representational version of sensorimotor enactivism. As such, accepting RSE 
allows one to explain (conscious) perception to be constituted entirely by behavioural interactions 
with the environment, whilst providing a phenomenologically intuitive account of (conscious) per-
ception. 
This presents an improvement upon PP, if taken as a stand-alone theory of conscious perception, 
because that theory faces the (quite familiar) problem of having to provide a phenomenologically 
compelling explanation of how sub-personal, non-conscious, brain-based processing could ‘give rise’ 
to personal level, conscious perception. Although this is an active area of research within PP, barring 
a complete conceptual or scientific revolution, it is difficult to see how any particular brain-based 
13 It is on this point that RSE departs from, and improves upon, other theories which take conscious perception to be constituted by behaviour (Dennett 
1993; Ryle 1949/2000; Wittgenstein 1953/2009). Unlike these behaviourist theses, which (arguably) fall prey to the problem of verificationism, RSE 
can provide a phenomenologically compelling account of conscious perception whilst taking conscious perception to be constituted by behaviour. 
The main reason that RSE avoids the problem of verificationism is that it presents one with a dynamic view of conscious perception, upon which 
the environment itself constitutively plays an active role in proceedings. For an extended argument for this point, the interested reader can consult 
(Downey 2016, ch. 3; cf. Clark and Chalmers 1998; Hurley 1998, p. 420-22; Hurley 2001).  
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account could provide a phenomenologically compelling explanation of the inter-relation between 
sub-personal, personal, and conscious levels of explanation. As Hurley and Noë explain: 
By contrast, if it is brought to our attention that activity in a certain brain area is correlated with vision, we 
do indeed still want to ask: “But why does brain activity there go with what it is like to see, rather than to 
hear or touch?” (Hurley & Noë 2003, p. 147)
The problem with brain-based accounts is that, regardless of the specifics of the account in ques-
tion, the identification of a certain brain-based process with a certain experience is always going to 
appear arbitrary. Furthermore, there is always going to be an air of mystery surrounding how the phe-
nomenology of conscious perception could be contained within, or identified with, the brain. Even 
the most enthusiastic proponents of PP admit that this is a problem for the view, and they are quite 
forth-right in conceding that there has, as yet, been no concrete proposals as to how PP could provide 
a novel solution to it (Hohwy 2013, p. 202; Clark 2016, ch. 7, §16).14
In summary, RSE explains (conscious) perception entirely in terms of behavior (both organismal 
and environmental), and it does so whilst accounting for the phenomenology of conscious perception. 
Moreover, it provides this phenomenologically plausible account whilst providing an explanation as to 
how the sub-personal, personal, and conscious levels of explanation inter-relate without invoking any 
naturalistically mysterious or metaphysically suspect properties or posits. PP, when taken as a stand-
alone theory of conscious perception, cannot provide such an account. RSE provides a more elegant 
and phenomenologically plausible account of the relation between different levels of explanation in 
conscious perception than PP taken alone. Therefore, RSE should be preferred as a theory of conscious 
perception on this basis. 
4.2  Benefit Two— Accounting for Empirical Data
The second major benefit accrued by accepting RSE concerns its empirical consequences. RSE is ad-
vanced within the intellectual tradition of enactive and ecological approaches to conscious perception. 
PP, however, is advanced from within the intellectual tradition of cognitivist approaches to conscious 
perception. Although each of these traditions boasts their own empirically successful research pro-
grammes, they are generally thought to directly conflict with one another. Consequently, it is usually 
thought that acceptance of one approach requires a wholesale rejection of the other (Chemero 2009; 
Hohwy 2016). RSE does not, however, require a wholesale rejection of cognitivist insights. Quite the 
contrary, in fact— not only is PP compatible with RSE, it actually constitutes a crucial component of 
the overall RSE framework (as we have seen). Thus, by accepting RSE and taking non-representational 
PP to provide an explanation and implementation of the sub-personal aspects of that framework, we 
arrive at a theory which can take advantage of the empirical work carried out on behalf of both enac-
tive/ecological and cognitivist traditions.
This is beneficial because both of these paradigms have given rise to empirically productive research 
programmes, which have led to numerous novel and predicted empirical results. Scientific research 
programmes survive largely on the basis of their empirical productivity, with empirical productivity 
itself generally thought to require an inference to the best explanation— the theory is empirically pro-
ductive because it accurately describes its domain of study.15 Although one can reject even empirically 
successful research programmes (for example, because one thinks they do not correctly describe a 
given domain of study), in order to do so one must explain how the science can be successful despite 
presenting us with an incorrect model of the world. Because RSE can accept empirical work carried 
14 For an extended argument for this point, the interested reader can consult (Downey 2016, ch. 3). 
15  Of course, there is a large literature on inference to the best explanation (and the related topics of realism, instrumentalism, and anti-realism) within 
the philosophy of science. I do not intend to presume a definitive answer to questions within this topic here. Rather, I am simply making the point 
that, by and large, the success of a scientific research programme usually gives us (defeasible) reasons to accept realism about its posits. 
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out in both traditions, it can simply side-step this problem. There is no need to reject, or otherwise 
eliminate, the vast swathes of empirical work carried out in either scientific tradition. Thus, on RSE, 
we have no need to reject an inference to the best explanation in either domain of study. 
In fact, not only can RSE accept empirical work carried out on behalf of two traditionally opposed 
scientific frameworks, it actually can be used to help illuminate the distinction between the two re-
search traditions and provide guidance for future empirical research. RSE equates the sub-personal 
level with the brain, and explains the brain’s role to be that of controlling behaviour. Furthermore, it 
champions non-representational PP as the theory which should be used to study the brain. Thus, if we 
are interested in investigating the sub-personal aspects of RSE, we can do so by applying the conceptu-
al and empirical tools of non-representational PP to the study of the brain (see, for example, Hohwy et 
al. 2008).16 If, however, we are more interested in investigating the personal level of explanation, then 
we can do so by using the methods of enactive and ecological approaches to study the interaction, and 
inter-relation between, the organism and its environment (see, for example, Chemero 2009). Finally, 
if we wish to study conscious perception, we can simply study the manner in which the perceiving or-
ganism is able to perceive ‘attentively’ (Anderson 2014; Mole 2011). In short, RSE helps to demarcate 
between the different levels of explanation within the science of conscious perception and therefore 
provides guidance as to which tools and techniques are appropriate for a given area of study. 
The second benefit of accepting RSE, then, is that one arrives at an empirical integration of enac-
tive/ecological and cognitivist approaches to conscious perception. This is beneficial because theorists 
can then take advantage of the excellent empirical work carried out within both traditions. Further-
more, this conjunction provides a clear and clean conceptual distinction between empirical work on 
the sub-personal, personal, and conscious levels of perception that provides guidance for the methods 
and frameworks which scientists should be using to study a given aspect of conscious perception. 
Thus, not only does RSE help to simplify and clarify the conceptual terrain of empirical work, it also 
provides empirical guidance. 
5  Conclusion
In this paper I have outlined RSE, explained how a non-representational version of PP can be used 
to empirically explain its sub-personal aspects, and argued that the resulting account of conscious per-
ception is to be preferred over PP taken as a stand-alone theory. I began by outlining the sensorimotor 
enactive theory of conscious perception, and explaining that this theory is problematic because two 
of its key posits (“sensorimotor knowledge” and “attention”) either require representation or are left 
explanatorily vacuous. I argued for an account of sensorimotor knowledge in which it is taken to be 
constituted entirely by non-representational causal mediation and/or behavioural dispositions. Then, 
I outlined a non-representational and adverbial theory of attention and argued that it should be ap-
plied to sensorimotor enactivism. As such, I arrived at a thoroughly non-representational version of 
sensorimotor enactivism, and so at radical sensorimotor enactivism. 
It is often objected that theories such as RSE are empirically vacuous. In particular, it is often argued 
that these theories are incapable of accounting for the brain’s role in mentality. I outlined a non-repre-
sentational version of PP and explained how it could be used to empirically explain the sub-personal, 
brain-based aspects of RSE. Therefore, I concluded that RSE cannot be objected to on the basis that it 
ignores the brain’s role in conscious perception. Then, I explained why RSE should in fact be preferred 
as an account of conscious perception over rival cognitivist theories (such as representational PP). I 
argued that RSE provides a better account of the inter-relation between the sub-personal, personal, 
16 In their account of binocular rivalry Hohwy et al. accept a representational version of PP. In order to subsume this account within RSE, we would 
therefore have to accept a non-representational account of PP posits. We have already seen that such an account can be given. In the case of rivalry, it 
is the PP framework itself (and not its representational posits) which plays a key explanatory role (Anderson and Chemero 2013). Therefore, accept-
ing a non-representational account of PP’s posits would not weaken the explanation of rivalry provided by Hohwy et al.  
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and conscious levels of explanation than cognitivist theories, and that it can account for and guide a 
larger amount of empirical research. 
RSE is a novel theory of conscious perception which provides an over-arching conceptual frame-
work for the scientific study of conscious perception. It promises to unite a number of (seemingly 
incompatible) strands of empirical cognitive science whilst demystifying the very existence of con-
scious perception. In addition to taxonomising different areas of extant research and clarifying their 
scope and inter-relation, RSE provides guidance for the direction of future empirical work. The phe-
nomenon of conscious perception has only recently been submitted to sustained scientific scrutiny. 
Although there has of late been an explosion of empirical work on the topic, the empirical evidence 
accrued vastly out-weighs our ability to taxonomise and understand it. RSE provides a framework 
which can help to simplify this task substantially. I therefore conclude, on this basis, that it is worthy 
of further research, development, and critical scrutiny. 
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